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Incomplete Compensation and Migration Behavior:
Has Anything Changed Between 1990 and 2000?
David E. Clark, William E. Herrin, Thomas A. Knapp, and Nancy E. White

Marquette University, University of the Pacific, Pennsylvania State University - WB, and Bucknell University - USA

Abstract. Spatial equilibrium models rely on migration to arbitrage away differences in utility
across locations net of moving costs, where remaining differences in wages and rents reflect the
compensating differentials related to site-specific amenities. Recent refinements to the spatial
equilibrium model focus upon the prospect of disequilibrium in amenity markets. Amenity
market disequilibrium implies over- or under-compensation (incomplete compensation) across
some locations, which suggests a role for these factors in subsequent migration. This paper follows the theoretical and empirical approach of Clark, Herrin, Knapp, and White (2003). An
intercity wage regression is estimated where fixed effects capture the impact of site characteristics on wages. We then regress the fixed effects on a comprehensive vector of site attributes,
where the residuals capture incomplete compensation in wages. The derived measures of incomplete compensation are included in a binary logit model of migration. The results provide
further evidence that incomplete compensation for site characteristics is a significant factor in
migration decisions, and the findings are consistent with tendencies toward spatial equilibrium.

1. Introduction
Following the debates of the late 1970s and 1980s
regarding the determinants of household migration,
researchers now recognize the dual roles of disequilibrium factors in labor markets and equilibrium factors
driven by changes in demand for site-specific attributes. Clark et al. (2003) developed a model that included factors that capture disequilibrium in amenity
markets along with conventional equilibrium factors.
Clark et al. estimated a three stage empirical model
using the 1990 Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS),
where derived measures of city-specific incomplete
compensation were included as determinants of migration. In the first stage, an intercity wage regression
is regressed on demographic and human capital
measures in addition to a control for the median house
value and metropolitan area fixed effects [see Gabriel
and Rosenthal (1999)]. The fixed effects capture the
net impact of a location’s site characteristics on wages.
The fixed effects are regressed on a comprehensive

vector of site attributes in the second stage. With adequate controls for the salient site characteristics, the
residuals from the intercity wage regression can then
be interpreted as measures of over- and undercompensation in wages. Finally, the measures of incomplete compensation are included in a discrete
choice model of migration.
Clark et al. (2003) found that measures of overcompensation and under-compensation at both the
origin and destination locations had the anticipated
impacts on migration. Specifically, over-compensation
at the origin, and under-compensation at the destination, ceteris paribus, decreased the likelihood of a move,
while the opposite was found for under-compensation
at the origin and over-compensation at the destination.
A comparison of the marginal probabilities suggested
that incomplete compensation measures were more
important at the destination than the origin and that
households were generally more responsive to undercompensation than over-compensation.
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These findings provide the impetus for the present
paper. Here we set out to determine whether results
similar to Clark et al. (2003) can be obtained by applying the same empirical model to data from the recently
released 2000 PUMS. Similar findings from the 2000
data would provide additional support for the hypothesis that incomplete amenity compensation is a
significant factor in household migration decisions.1
The paper is organized as follows. A description of
the related literature is presented in Section 2. The
third section describes the empirical model. Empirical
findings are reported in Section 4 and the final section
of the paper contains concluding remarks.

2. Relevant Literature
Equilibrium approaches to migration tend to emphasize locational attributes while disequilibrium
models focus on economic opportunity variables. Research by some scholars (Greenwood, 1985; Greenwood and Hunt, 1989; Evans, 1990) found that disequilibrium factors were important determinants of
migration, whereas other studies (Graves, 1979;
Graves and Linneman, 1979; Knapp and Graves, 1982;
Clark and Hunter, 1992; Mueser and Graves, 1995)
demonstrate that site-characteristics play an important
role. As Hunt (1993) suggests in his survey of migration models, disequilibrium in amenity markets had
not yet been considered as a determinant of migration.
Following Herzog and Schlottmann (1993), it became
clear that amenity induced migration and amenity
valuation were inextricably linked.
Since the work of Rosen (1979), which was refined
by Roback (1982), and Blomquist, Berger and Hoehn
(1988), it has been recognized that spatial variation in
amenities are capitalized into local wages and land
rents. While not the focus of these studies, migration
is the mechanism by which amenity capitalization is
revealed in local factor prices. Research explicitly
aimed at examining the role of amenities as determinants of household migration followed (Berger and
Blomquist (1992), Graves (1979), and Graves and Linneman (1979)). The studies following Rosen were
grounded in the equilibrium approach to migration,
where, in equilibrium, utility is spatially invariant and
there is no incentive to migrate. However, Graves
(1979) and Graves and Linneman (1979) found that
shifts in amenity demands such as changes in income
or life-cycle induced changes in preferences create incentives for migration. Therefore, two sources of
1 In contrast to migration studies using microdata, Clark (2006)
found that net migration rates were not significantly influenced by
the incomplete compensation measures derived in Clark et al.
(2003).
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amenity driven migration are evident from previous
research. One is derived from the equilibrium approach, where changes in amenity demands influence
migration. The second source of amenity driven migration results from disequilibrium in amenity markets, which includes the over-compensation or undercompensation for site attributes in local wages and
land rents. Both sources of amenity driven migration
are analyzed in Clark, et al. (2003) and in this paper.

3. Model
The theoretical foundation for the empirical model
is derived from Henderson (1982) who showed an
equilibrium tradeoff between the city wage and amenity bundle which he defines as a wage-opportunity
locus (WOL). As is seen in Figure 1, the WOL is an equilibrium reduced-form model that is mapped by the
tangencies of household wage-acceptance functions
(WA1-WA3) and firm offer functions (FO1-F03). The
wage-acceptance function is an iso-utility curve for
consumers and the various curves WA1-WA3 represent
different individuals with different tastes. Likewise,
the firm-offer curve is an iso-profit curve, and FO1-F03

Figure 1. Wage-Amenity Tradeoff

represent different competitive firms that are breaking
even. In equilibrium, households and firms sort themselves along the WOL such that no further reallocations can generate utility or profit enhancing
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moves2. However, if a particular city offers a wageamenity bundle that is above or below the WOL (e.g.,
WA4 at amenity level A1), then that city is offering a
wage that is higher than is necessary (i.e., W4>W2) to
compensate for the city’s amenity bundle. We define
W4>W2 as over-compensation, which is assumed to
generate in-migration. If the city is small relative to
the national labor market, it is expected that inmigration would ultimately return the city to the equilibrium wage (W2).
A sample of 142,138 households residing in 78
MSAs was drawn from the 2000 PUMS database3. The
three stage process outlined in Clark et al. (2003) was
applied to this sample. It is summarized as follows:
Stage 1: Deriving metropolitan fixed effects
Ordinary least squares was used to estimate the following hedonic wage equation of stage one. The
equation to be estimated is:
ln (annual wage income) = Xiβ + ajδj + eij

(1)

The vector X represents personal characteristics,
and fixed effects dummy variables are expressed by δj,
where the parameter aj is a measure of the average effect on wage income, ceteris paribus, of residing in a
given MSA. Equation (1) is estimated without an intercept term; therefore, the fixed effects represent unique
2 While Roback (1980) shows that interregional amenity differences
are capitalized into both wages and land rents, Henderson (1982)
notes that as long as the average land value is controlled in the
equation, that this is akin to the individual who locates at the edge
of the city, and hence all capitalization is reflected in wage differentials.
3 The IPUMS interface was used to extract the 2000 PUMS 1% sample. A much smaller sample of metropolitan areas were identified
in the 2000 PUMS sample than in the 1990 PUMS sample. This is
because of a change in the manner in which spatial areas were defined. In the 1990 PUMS, the so-called PUMAs (Public Use Microdata Areas) were constructed by the Census to coincide with metropolitan boundaries. Hence, the 1990 PUMS identified all metropolitan areas with population of at least 100,000 persons (i.e. the minimum PUMA size). In contrast, the 2000 Census focused on SuperPUMAs with populations of at least 400,000. Thus, the minimum
size for metropolitan areas that are identified in the 2000 PUMS was
400,000. Furthermore, states that defined their own Super-PUMAs
were not required to have the boundaries of those areas coincide
with the boundaries of metropolitan areas. Overall, this dramatically reduced the number of metropolitan areas that were reported
by the Census. After adjusting the sample for missing data, we
were left with 78 metropolitan areas as compared to 267 in 1990.
While the spatial distribution of metropolitan areas across the four
Census Regions was similar between 1990 and 2000, the size distribution was not. The average population of the metropolitan areas
was 696,154 persons in the 1990 sample and 1,789,101 persons in
2000. As will be seen in the discussion of our findings, this limits
some of our conclusions.

intercepts for each of the 78 MSAs. Because there are
no site characteristics in the model except the median
price of housing, the coefficient on the fixed effects
reflects the MSA-specific intercept term. The fixed
effects vary as a result of the capitalization of site
characteristics, as well as other unmeasured factors
that lead to wage over- and under-compensation in
the metropolitan area.
All variable definitions, data sources and descriptive statistics are included in Table 1. The vector of
human capital and effort related variables include education and imputed experience (computed as ageeducation-6) in linear and quadratic form, male, the
dichotomous variables Asian, black, Hispanic, and other
race. Work effort is proxied by the annual hours of
work, married, children, and unemployed. A dummy
variable is used to measure whether the worker speaks
English well. Housing costs are proxied by median
value. The occupational and industrial classifications are
included to account for compensating differentials
related to the job and the industry. The occupational
category also controls for human capital differences
that are correlated with occupation.
Stage 2: Obtaining over-compensation and undercompensation measures
The purpose of this second stage is to explain the
spatial variation in wages associated with the levels of
site attributes. The estimated first stage fixed effects
coefficients for each MSA are regressed on a comprehensive vector of site attributes. The residuals from
stage two are interpreted as measures of incomplete
compensation in wages.
The fiscal factors and natural amenities controls
include measures of state and local taxation (income
tax, total tax) and spending (education spending, highway
spending, hospital spending, police spending, and welfare
spending). The amenity list includes variables related
to climate (precipitation, heating, cooling, temperature
difference, sunshine, and wind speed), proximity to an
ocean coast, violent crime, air quality (pmna), and average commute time to work for the metro area. In addition, unmeasured amenities and disamenities related
to urban scale are proxied by population density in
linear and quadratic form (density squared), and total
population. We include the metropolitan area unemployment rate to account for local business cycles that
can affect household perceptions of the MSA.
We regress the estimated city-specific fixed effects
from stage one on the site characteristic vector (Zj) as
shown in equation (2), where the residuals are denoted with uj. To avoid confusion, we define the estimated city-specific fixed effects from stage one as aj*

Incomplete Compensation and Migration
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Table 1. Variable Names, Definitions, Expected Signs, Data Sources
Variable
name
log(annual wage
income) a

Definition
[mean, standard deviation in brackets]

Annual wage income earned in 1999: [10.38, 0.67]

Human Capital Variables
educationa
Years of education: [13.36, 2.95]
experiencea,
Years of experience, defined as age-education-6: [17.70, 10.77]
experience2 a
experience*experience
malea
Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual is male, 0 otherwise [0.57,
0.50]
marrieda
Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual
is married, 0
otherwise [0.52, 0.50]
childrena
Number of children in the household, 0 otherwise: [0.46, 0.50]
blacka
Dichotomous variable=1 if individual is black, 0 otherwise [0.14,
0.35]
Asiana
Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual is Asian or Pacific islander, 0 otherwise: [0.06, 0.23]
Hispanica
Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual is of Hispanic ethnicity, 0
otherwise: [0.16, 0.37]
other racea
Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual is not white, black, or
Asian; 0 otherwise: [0.09, 0.28]
annual hoursa
Average total hours worked in 1989: [2250.56, 434.82]
unemployeda
Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual is currently (2000) unemployed, 0 otherwise; [0.02, 0.13]
Englisha
Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual speaks English well or
very well, 0 otherwise: [0.95, 0.22]
Fiscal Variables
income taxb
total

taxb

education spendingb
highway spendingb
hospital spendingb
police spendingb
welfare spendingb
highway spendingb

Expected
Sign

dep.
variable
+
+
+
?
?
?
?
?
?
+
+

State income tax revenue/$1,000 taxable income: [103.86, 10.57]

+

Per capita total tax liability for the metro area of residence
(weighted county average for multi-county metro areas):
[1025.42, 362.15]
Per capita education spending for the metro area of residence
(weighted county avg. for multi-county metro areas): [43.67,
8.10]
Per capita highway spending for the metro area of residence
(weighted county avg. for multi-county metro areas): [4.14, 1.33]
Per capita hospital spending for the metro area of residence
(weighted county avg. for multi-county metro areas): [7.24, 5.51]
Per capita highway spending for the metro area of residence
(weighted county avg. for multi-county metro areas): [4.14, 1.33]
Per capita public safety spending for the metro area of residence
(weighted county avg. for multi-county metro areas): [5.66, 1.31]
Per capita welfare spending for the metro area of residence
(weighted county avg. for multi-county metro areas): [3.91, 4.27]

+
-

-
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Table 1 (continued). Variable Names, Definitions, Expected Signs, Data Sources

Variable
name

Definition
[mean, standard deviation in brackets]

Amenity Variables
precipitationc
Annual inches of precipitation[36.01, 14.23]
heatingc
Number of heating degree days per year (1 heating degree day
= heating the residence 1 degree to 65o F for 1 day: [461.37,
2130.71]
coolingc
Number of cooling degree days per year (1 cooling degree day =
cooling the residence 1 degree to 65o F for 1 day: [1509.90,
1072.96]
temperature difDifference between average max. July temp. and average max.
ferencec
January temp.:[37.54, 10.60]
sunshinec
Percentage of available sunshine: [60.22, 9.47]
wind speedc
Average annual wind speed: [8.93, 1.34]
coast
Dichotomous variable = 1 if the MSA of residence has an ocean
coastline, 0 otherwise: [0.52, 0.50]
violent crimed
Violent crime rate = number of violent crimes divided by total
population – 2000: [0.02, 0.013]
commute timee
Average commuting time to work in minutes for the metro
area.: [25.12, 3.42]
densitye
Population density = divided by metropolitan land area:
density squared
[666.76, 958.46]
total populatione
Total 2000 metropolitan population: [1789101, 1851801]
median valuee
pmnaf

unemployment
rateg

Median value of housing for the metro area of residence:
[76443.46, 38416.10]
Dichotomous variable = 1 if the metro area of residence was declared a nonattainment region for concentrations of particulate
matter of 10 microns or less in 1990, 0 otherwise: [0.12, 0.32]
MSA unemployment rate – 1999: [4.75, 3.06]

Expected
Sign

+
+

+

+
+
+
+
?
?
?
?
+

+

a – 2000 Public Use Microdata Sample drawn from IPUMS database; b – County and City Extra for 2002; c – National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Climatology of the United States; d – FBI Uniform Crime Reports; e- 2000 Census of
Population and Housing; f – EPA Criteria Pollutant; g – U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

and we denote the predicted values from the estimation of equation (2) as âj.
aj* = Zj γj + uj

(2)

In general, a positive error uj >0 implies aj* > âj;
that is, equation (2) under-predicts the hedonic wage
compensation. If equation (2) under-predicts the hedonic wage, this implies that the actual wage is higher
than the predicted wage and there is overcompensation. Likewise, a negative error uj <0 implies
aj* < âj, in which case the model over-predicts the fixed

effects and there is under-compensation in wages
given the site characteristics.
Stage 3: The Migration Equation
Lastly, the PUMS data are used to determine
whether wage under or over-compensation influences
the probability of migrating to another city. Migration is defined as a household’s change in metropolitan area over the period 1995-2000. Nonmovers are
defined as those who have changed houses without
changing metropolitan areas. Following Clark et al.
(2003), we select only those households who changed

Incomplete Compensation and Migration

residence over the period so as to focus on the location
decisions of marginal households (i.e., those households that drive hedonic compensation). Hence,
among this relatively mobile subset of the general
population, we investigate the importance of incomplete compensation at the origin and/or the destination in determining the optimal location.
The binary logit model is shown in the following
equation:
Prob(Migr)i = Xiβi + Zojβoj + Zdjβdj + goNoj*abs(uoj) +
hoPojuoj + gdNdjabs(udj)+ hdPdjudj + ei (3)
The Xi vector of personal characteristics is defined
above and ei represents the usual error term. The site
characteristics vector Zj is subscripted to denote the
levels of these characteristics at the origin (o) and destination (d). The four remaining terms are comprised
of the residuals (uj) drawn from equation (2) as well as
indicator variables to differentiate positive (P) from
negative (N) residuals for both the origin and destination. Because we are utilizing micro-data, it is reasonable to assume that public sector characteristics are
exogenous to migration. This construction of the migration equation permits under- and overcompensation to have different effects at the origin as
compared to the destination. We let Pj = 1 if a given
uj > 0; Pj = 0 otherwise, and Nj = 1 if uj < 0; Nj = 0 otherwise. For ease of interpretation, we then take the
absolute value of the negative residuals multiplied by
the No and Nd dummy variables. The coefficients go,
gd, ho, and hd capture the influence on migration of
hedonic over or under-compensation for origin and
destination. We assume that potential migrants respond to utility differences that include incomplete
compensation of site characteristics in wages.
Whether a location has a positive or negative fixed
effect is largely irrelevant to this analysis. If, for example, an individual is over-compensated at any location, that individual is better off than if he/she resided, ceteris paribus, at an alternative location. We
expect, a priori, that over-compensation at the origin
deters migration (ho<0) , while over-compensation at
the destination encourages it (hd>0). The opposite
should be true for under-compensation at the origin
and destination respectively (i.e., go>0, gd<0).
The vector of Personal Characteristics includes
the age and education of the householder, marital status
(married), the presence of children in the household,
race and ethnicity (Asian, black, Hispanic, and other race)
and the employment status of the householder (unemployed). The origin and destination Locational Characteristics that are used in the specification of the
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fixed effects equation (stage two) are also included in
the migration model.

4. Empirical Results
Results of the wage income regression from equation (1) are summarized in Table 2. After controlling
for workers’ occupational and industrial classifications, all of the coefficients for personal characteristics
are signed as expected with p-values less than 0.001.
The magnitudes of the coefficients are also reasonable.
For example, males earn 20.7% more than females, and
English fluency raises income by 10.8%. Also, different racial and ethnic groups earn between 5.8% and
16.7% less than whites. Additionally, virtually all of
the estimated coefficients for the occupational and industrial dummy variables are significant at the 5%
level. Finally, an F-test is used to determine if the set
of fixed effect MSA dummy variables significantly
increases the explanatory power of the regression.
The computed F-Statistic is 30.16, which suggest with
virtual certainty that inclusion of the fixed effect variables improves the explanatory power, and that location features contribute to spatial variation in wage
income.4
The second stage results are shown in Table 3.
White’s test of the residuals from this regression
shows no evidence of heteroskedasticity. Nine of the
21 estimated coefficients are significant at the 5% level
or better, while three others are significant at 10%.
The significant coefficients are precipitation, cooling,
tempdiff, sunshine, commute time, density, density squared,
population, total tax, police spending, welfare spending,
and unemployment rate.5 The positive coefficient for
unemployment rate indicates that higher metropolitan
area unemployment is perceived as a disamenity requiring higher compensating wage income. This result is consistent with many other estimates (see Topel,
1986, for a summary of these studies). The positive
coefficients on police spending and welfare spending suggest these site attributes are disamenities. Perhaps
these variables are capturing the impacts of omitted
socioeconomic disamenities that necessitate higher per
capita spending on police and welfare.
The adjusted R2 of 0.81 and F = 16.32 suggests
with near certainty (p < 0.0001) that site-specific amenity and fiscal characteristics explain much of the MSA4 The equation is estimated without an intercept in order to avoid
losing any of the 78 different MSA fixed effect coefficient estimates.
The fixed effect coefficients therefore capture both the intercept
influence as well as the average city-specific effect. However, they
are not expressed relative to an omitted city as would be the case
had the intercept been included.
5 The sign of the coefficient on commute time appears anomalous.

146

Clark et al.

Table 2. Wage-Opportunity Locusa

Human Capital and Median Value:
Variable
Coefficient
education
0.069096
experience
0.028834
experience2
-0.000426
male
0.207844
children
0.078844
black
-0.166761
asian
-0.145828
other race
-0.057768
hispanic
-0.127669
english
0.108007
annual hours
0.000260
median value
0.000020
Occupational Dummy Variables:
administration
0.093347
architect/engineer
0.343005
business operations
0.333780
computers/math
0.445348
construction
0.145935
education/librarian
0.137974
entertainment
0.231328
extractive
0.119316
finance
0.343612
food
-0.033536
health
0.312665
legal
0.438559
maintenance
-0.065591
materials mover
0.015925

t-score
112.77
70.38
-47.48
65.67
28.06
-39.79
-23.41
-9.10
-23.51
15.48
79.81
2.29
2.87
10.19
9.98
13.39
4.38
4.12
6.82
1.58
10.26
-1.00
9.43
12.65
-1.97
0.49

Occupational Dummy Variables – continued:
Variable
Coefficient
t-score
management
0.436586
13.38
production
0.060330
1.84
protective services
0.142203
4.21
repair
0.179293
5.44
sales
0.240795
7.37
science
0.194800
5.48
service
-0.036870
-1.08
social science
0.064792
1.88
Industrial Dummy Variables:
agriculture/forestry/fishery
-0.095078
-3.25
military industrial
-0.200211
-7.42
arts/entertainment
-0.196271
-21.77
construction
-0.014094
-1.50
education/social
-0.100109
-12.87
financial/insurance/real est.
0.040330
5.40
information/communication
0.067535
7.49
Manufacturing
0.032751
4.62
mining
0.152175
4.73
professional/scientific
-0.017216
-2.36
public administration
0.054925
5.96
Retail
-0.165634
-22.96
Transportation
0.022457
2.59
Other
-0.160095
-17.57

a. intercept suppressed, number of observations = 142,138, unreported MSA dummy variables = 78

specific wage variation. Therefore, the residuals from
this regression can be reasonably interpreted as a
measure of wage compensation net of amenity and
public sector influences. Specifically, positive residuals represent MSA wage and salary income greater
than that which the second stage regression predicts.
Similarly, negative residuals measure MSA wage and
salary income below what the regression predicts.
We next use these residuals as measures of wage and
salary over- and under-compensation to explain
household migration between MSAs for a sample of
99,955 households that changed residence during the
1995-2000 period. Specifically, we estimated equation
(3) to predict the probability that a household migrates, where migration is defined as a change of
MSA. The results are shown in Table 4. The marginal
impact of a regressor on the probability of migrating

(i.e., changing MSA) is computed as β*p*(1-p), where
β is a regressor’s estimated coefficient and p is the estimated probability of migrating computed at the
mean values of all the regressors.6 For example, aging
one year lowers the probability of migrating by 0.2%
while being male raises it by 1.2%.
Computing the odds ratio for each regressor,
shown in the last column of Table 4, is perhaps a more
revealing way to interpret the logit findings. This ratio represents the change in the odds of migration resulting from a one standard deviation increase in a
regressor. With a logit specification, the odds of migration are specified in equation (4).

6 β*p*(1-p) for a dummy variable is computed as the discrete change
in p as the variable changes from 0 to 1.
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Table 3. Fixed Effect Regression (dependent variable = aj*: location specific fixed effects)a

Variable

Coefficient

Standard
error

t-ratio

pr.>|t|

7.013
0.013
2.42x10-5
3.88x10-4
0.034
-0.031
-0.020
0.857
0.016
-0.065
0.037
-8.61x10-4
4.86x10-8
1.68x10-7
-0.001
-3.43x10-4
0.008
-0.029
0.013
0.127
0.036
0.042

1.460
0.005
1.10x10-4
1.14x10-4
0.013
0.011
0.047
3.31
0.029
0.027
0.158
2.51x10-4
2.61x10-8
4.83x10-8
0.006
2.04x10-4
0.010
0.045
0.011
0.045
0.019
0.016

4.80
2.38
0.22
3.40
2.60
-2.71
-0.43
0.26
0.55
-2.38
0.24
-3.42
1.87
3.48
-0.18
-1.68
0.81
-0.64
1.21
2.80
1.89
2.64

<0.001
0.021
0.828
0.001
0.012
0.009
0.671
0.797
0.586
0.021
0.814
0.001
0.067
0.001
0.855
0.099
0.422
0.525
0.231
0.007
0.065
0.011

intercept
precipitation
heating
cooling
temperature difference
sunshine
wind speed
violent crime
coast
commute time
pmna
density
density squared
total population
income tax
total tax
education spending
highway spending
hospital spending
police spending
welfare spending
unemployment rate

a. number of observations: 78, RADJ 2: 0.807, F-statistic: 16.32

Ω(Z, z1) =

Σβ jZ j

p
=e j
1− p

(4)

.

The odds ratio for a one standard deviation (σ) increase in z1 can then be expressed as
Ω( Z , z1 + σ ) e
=
Ω ( Z , z1 )

β1 ( Z1 +σ ) + Σ β j Z j
j −1

e

β 1 Z1 + Σ β j Z j
j −1

Σ β jZ j

=

e β1Z1 e β1σ e j −1

Σ β jZ j

e β1Z1 e j −1

= e β1σ .

(5)

That is, the odds ratio for a regressor is simply the
product of the exponential of its corresponding coefficient estimate times the standard deviation of the variable.
The site-specific characteristics are measured at
both the MSA of origin and destination. Forty-one of
the 46 estimated coefficients in this category are significant at the 0.001 level. With few exceptions (e.g.,
air quality, pmna), all of the significant estimated coeffi-

cients have the anticipated signs. The odds ratios reported in Table 4 can be used to illustrate the strength
of the findings. For example, a one standard deviation
increase in an amenity such as per capita education
spending at the destination MSA increases the odds of
migrating by 19.2% while the same increase at the origin MSA lowers the odds of migrating by about 16.6%.
For a disamenity such as travel time to work, a standard deviation increase in the average commuting
time at the destination MSA lowers the odds of migrating by approximately 27.8%, while the same increase travel time at the origin MSA increases the odds
of migrating by 110.6%.7
The four estimated coefficients for the measures of
incomplete compensation are of the correct sign and
they are significant at less than the 0.001 level. The
7 A one standard deviation increase in commute time raises the average commute 17%.
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odds ratios suggest that a standard deviation increase
in over-compensation at the destination MSA makes the
odds of migration 72.1% higher, while the same increase in over-compensation at the origin MSA lowers
the odds of migration by 39.5%. Similarly, a standard
deviation increase in under-compensation at the destination MSA lowers the odds of migration by 45.5%,
while the same increase in under-compensation at the
origin MSA increases the odds of migrating by 85.3%.
Another method of evaluating the impact of incomplete compensation on the propensity to migrate is to
consider the migration response that would have been
expected in the absence of incomplete compensation.

Column 4 of Table 4 shows the marginal probabilities
used for these calculations.
Recall that undercompensation at the origin and over-compensation at
the destination are the measures that increase the
probability of migrating. In the absence of undercompensation at the origin, the probability of migrating would fall by 3.8%. The probability of migrating
would fall 4.7% without over-compensation at the destination. Overall, these results suggest that the probability of migrating would have been 8.5% lower
without the combined average effects of undercompensation at the origin and over-compensation at
the destination.

Table 4. Migration Equation (dependent variable: change MSA = 1, 0 otherwise)

Variable
age
education
male
married
children
black
Asian
Hispanic
other race
unemployed
median valued
median valueo
income taxd
income taxo
total taxd
total taxo
education spendingd
education spendingo
highway spendingd
highway spendingo
hospital spendingd
hospital spendingo
police spendingd
police spendingo
welfare spendingd
welfare spendingo
precipitationd
precipitationo
heatingd
heatingo
coolingd
coolingo

Coefficient

Z

pr.>|Z|

βp(1-p)

odds ratio

-0.017
0.166
0.109
0.044
-0.366
-0.143
0.170
0.007
-0.011
0.029
6.0-5
-7.0x10-5
-0.0095
0.0054
-0.0019
0.0019
0.024
-0.025
-0.033
-0.038
0.078
-0.076
0.394
-0.398
0.106
-0.105
0.047
-0.051
-1.0x10-5
8.0x10-5
0.0014
-0.0015

-18.39
43.09
4.87
1.93
-17.33
-4.60
4.36
0.17
-0.22
0.39
14.81
-16.17
-3.54
2.01
-13.07
13.88
3.70
-3.80
-1.23
-1.39
11.35
-10.69
9.67
-10.17
7.12
-7.28
10.56
-11.75
-0.21
1.41
13.08
-13.77

<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.054
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.863
0.827
0.693
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.044
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.217
0.164
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.838
0.158
<0.001
<0.001

-0.002
0.019
0.012
0.005
-0.042
-0.016
0.020
0.0008
-0.0013
0.003
7.33x10-6
-7.59x10-6
-0.001
6.1x10-4
-2.1x10-4
2.2x10-4
0.0027
-0.0028
-0.0037
-0.0044
0.0089
-0.0087
0.045
-0.045
0.012
-0.012
0.0053
-0.0057
-1.24x10-6
8.97x10-6
1.61x10-4
-1.66x10-4

0.837
1.622
1.052
1.022
0.833
0.953
1.039
1.002
0.997
1.004
25.07
0.034
0.878
1.076
0.418
2.506
1.192
0.834
0.960
0.954
1.373
0.738
1.681
0.587
1.701
0.589
1.900
0.503
0.977
1.181
3.988
0.247
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Table 4 (continued). Migration Equation (dependent variable: change MSA = 1, 0 otherwise)a

Variable
temperature diff.
temperature diff.
sunshined
sunshineo
wind speedd
wind speedo
violent crimed
violent crimeo
coastd
coasto
commute timed
commute timeo
pmnad
pmnao
densityd
densityo
density squaredd
density squaredo
total populationd
total populationo
overcomp.d
overcomp.o
undercomp.d
undercomp.o

Coefficient

Z

pr.>|Z|

βp(1-p)

odds ratio

0.079
-0.108
-0.106
0.117
0.095
-0.029
-11.461
9.366
0.102
-0.078
-0.067
0.151
1.668
-1.382
-0.0045
0.0042
3.14x10-7
-2.88x10-7
3.13x10-7
-4.86x10-7
4.163
-3.919
-3.296
3.346

8.38
-11.62
-10.80
12.40
4.03
-1.25
-5.83
4.79
7.74
-5.85
-3.34
7.58
18.40
-15.12
-18.58
17.83
16.89
-15.75
7.60
-12.07
14.73
-14.22
-12.58
13.48

<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.212
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001

0.009
-0.012
-0.012
0.013
0.011
-0.003
-1.301b
1.064b
0.012
-0.009
-0.008
0.017
0.241
-0.133
-5.1x10-4
4.7x10-4
3.56x10-8
-3.28x10-8
3.56x10-8
-5.51x10-8
0.473
-0.445
-0.374
0.380

2.690
0.258
0.372
2.925
1.135
0.961
0.888
1.101
1.331
0.802
0.722
2.106
2.158
0.526
0.0001
1.12x104
380.474
0.0036
2.679
0.212
1.721
0.605
0.545
1.853

a. number of obs: 99,955; CHMSA=1: 15,724; CHMSA=0: 84,231; log likelihood: -38812 (0.497). Descriptive statistics for personal variables [mean, std. dev.]: age [37.73,10.18]; education [13.78,2.92]; male [0.68,0.47]; married [0.51,0.50]; children
[0.50,0.50]; black [0.13,0.34]; asian [0.05,0.23]; hispanic [0.14,0.35]; other race [0.07,0.26]; unemployed [0.02,0.13].
b. The absolute values of marginal probabilities cannot be greater than 1. Note that the 95% confidence intervals for these
marginal probabilities contain -1 and 1 respectively.

Next, we examine temporal changes in the migration propensity with respect to our measures of incomplete compensation. Table 5 shows the odds ratios for the two time periods. Two results are apparent from this comparison: First, the overall ordinal
pattern of the effects of incomplete compensation is
the same for 2000 as for 1990. Over-compensation at
the destination and under-compensation at the origin
are stronger than over-compensation at the origin and
under-compensation at the destination. That is, for
mobile households, the pull of over-compensation at
the destination and the push of under-compensation at
the origin exceed the holding power of overcompensation at the origin and the repulsion of under-

compensation at the destination. Second, households
appeared to be more responsive to incomplete compensation during the 1990s than during the 1980s. A
standard deviation increase in over-compensation at
the destination MSA made migration 40.9% more
likely in 1990 but 72.1% more likely in 2000. This finding suggests that the pull of over-compensation has
strengthened for these cities. Similarly, a standard
deviation increase in over-compensation at the origin
MSA lowered the odds of migration by 21.6% in 1990
but by 39.5% in 2000, which implies stronger holding
power of the origin MSAs. Similar comparisons show
greater responsiveness in 2000 to under-compensation
at both the origin and destination MSAs. These results
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provide preliminary evidence that, for a one standard
deviation change in the incomplete compensation
measures, the tendencies toward equilibrium found in
1990 appear to have strengthened in 20008.

Table 5. Comparison of Odds Ratios for Incomplete
Compensation Variables (1990 v. 2000)

Incomplete Compensation Variable

Odds Ratios
(1990)

Odds Ratios
(2000)

overcompd
overcompo
undercompd
undercompo

1.409
0.784
0.576
1.470

1.721
0.605
0.545
1.853

Finally, in Table 6, we turn to a temporal and spatial comparison of the incomplete compensation
measures. Recall that 78 metropolitan areas were used
to derive the second stage residuals that are the measures of incomplete compensation. For this sample of
cities, there is a slight tendency of patterns from 1990
to persist in 2000. Specifically, 34.6% of those MSAs
that over-compensated in wages in 1990 also overcompensated in 2000, and 21.8% of those that undercompensated in 1990 were also under-compensating in
2000. However, these results imply that the remaining
43.6% showed signs in 2000 that were opposite those
of 1990. Across the four regions, there are two noteworthy spatial differences in incomplete compensation. In 2000, Northeastern MSAs comprised 19.2% of
the sample, but made up only 2.8% of the undercompensating MSAs. And, Midwestern MSAs were
17.9% of the sample in 1990, but were 28% of the sample that overcompensated in that year.
While measures of incomplete compensation from
1990 and 2000 are centered on zero since they represent residuals from the Stage 2 regression9, the variHowever, these comparisons must be qualified given that the size
distribution of metropolitan areas differs between the two periods.
Because the average size of the metropolitan areas is substantially
larger in 2000 relative to 1990, the higher responsiveness may indicate that the pull of new locations and the holding power of existing
locations are stronger in larger metropolitan areas.

8

9 Note that the mean of 1990 sample will not be equal to zero. The
residuals are derived from a subset of 78 MSAs drawn from the
larger set of 267 MSAs that were available in 1990, and hence included in the second stage regression. The mean value of the 78
residuals from the 1990 regression was –0.0214.

ance differs by more than a factor of 10. That is, the
standard deviation from 1990 sub-sample is 3.17, and
is only 0.27 for the 2000 sample. Not surprisingly, a
measure of equivalence of variance reveals that these
are significantly different at the 99% degree of confidence10. There are several possible explanations for
these differences. First, it is possible that the earlier
residuals were higher since they were derived from a
more complete sample of cities (i.e., 267 vs. 78). In
fact, the in-sample fit for the Stage 2 regression is
stronger in 2000 (R2adj=0.81) when compared to 1990
(R2adj=0.72). When the second stage regression for the
1990 sample was estimated on the 78 cities available
from the 2000 PUMS sample, the R2adj increased to
0.75. In addition, it is possible that the better fit also
reflects the increasing importance of site-specific
amenities and fiscal characteristics on the locational
choice, which has subsequently led to smaller residuals in the Stage 2 regression.

5. Conclusion
Our results from the 2000 PUMS yield further evidence that measures of incomplete compensation for
site characteristics are significant determinants of migration. Each stage of the three stage empirical model
generates results that are remarkably consistent with
Clark et al. (2003), which used 1990 data from the
PUMS. However, there are a few differences. In the
second stage, the site characteristics explain slightly
more variation in the wage in 2000 as compared with
1990. In the third stage, a comparison of the odds ratios reveals a stronger migration response to incomplete compensation in the latter period, even as the
mean level of incomplete compensation appears to
have fallen.
These findings have important implications for
our understanding of migration behavior. First, we
continue to find that measures which capture disequilibrium in amenity markets, that is, our incomplete
compensation variables, are significant determinants
of migration. The results presented here add to the
evidence that migrants are cognizant of the “utility
deal” offered by cities that over- or under-compensate
for their local amenity and fiscal mix. Secondly, equilibrium drivers such as amenities are important factors
in the migration decision. In fact, these factors appear
to explain more of the differences in real wages over
time. With the advent of the Internet, information
about any given community is readily available and at
The Bartlett test, which is a χ2 with one degree of freedom is
274.08. This tests the null hypothesis that the subgroup variances of
each year are equal, and assumes normally distributed variables.
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Table 6. Under-compensation and Over-compensation in 1990 and 2000

Over-compensation 2000
Over-compensation 1990

Under-compensation 1990

Under-compensation 2000

27 MSA’s (34.6%)
NE: 6; MW: 6; South: 9; West: 6

16 MSA’s (20.5%)
NE: 0; MW: 6; South: 7; West: 3

Akron, OH - Midwest
Albuquerque, NM - West
Atlanta, GA - South
Baltimore, MD - South
Buffalo, NY - Northeast
Cleveland, OH - Northeast
Dallas, TX - South
Ft. Wayne, IN - Midwest
Houston, TX - South
Indianapolis, IN - Midwest
Knoxville, TN - South
Lakeland, FL - South
Los Angeles, CA - West
Louisville, KY - South
Milwaukee, WI - Midwest
Monmouth, NJ - Northeast
Norfolk, VA - South
Philadelphia, PA - Northeast
Pittsburgh, PA - Northeast
Riverside, CA - West
San Diego, CA - West
Spokane, WA - West
Syracuse, NY - Northeast
Tacoma, WA - West
Tampa, FL - South
Toledo, OH - Midwest
Wichita, KS – Midwest

Canton, OH - Midwest
Charlotte, NC - South
Chicago, IL - Midwest
Cincinnati, OH - Midwest
Columbus, OH - Midwest
Detroit, MI - Midwest
Greensboro, NC - South
Kansas City, MO - South
Nashville, TN - South
New Orleans, LA - South
Pensacola, FL - South
Portland, OR - West
St. Louis, MO - South
Seattle, WA - West
Tucson, AZ - West
Youngstown, OH - Midwest

18 MSA’s (23.1%)
NE: 7; MW: 0; South: 6; West: 5

17 MSA’s (21.8%)
NE: 2; MW: 2; South: 8; West: 5

Allentown, PA - Northeast
Bakersfield, CA - West
Boise City, ID – West
Columbia, SC - South
Ft. Lauderdale, FL - South
Harrisburg, PA - Northeast
Hartford, CT - Northeast
Lancaster, PA - Northeast
Little Rock, AR - South
Melbourne, FL - South
Modesto, CA - West
New York, NY - Northeast
Orlando, FL - South
Providence, RI - Northeast
Salt Lake City, UT - West
San Antonio, TX - South
Springfield, MA - Northeast
Stockton, CA – West

Austin, TX - South
Baton Rouge, LA - South
Boston, MA - Northeast
Charleston, SC - South
Fresno, CA - West
Grand Rapids, MI - Midwest
Jackson, MS - South
Las Vegas, NV - West
McAllen, TX - South
Minneapolis, MN - Midwest
Phoenix, AZ - West
San Francisco, CA - West
San Jose, CA - West
Sarasota, FL - South
Scranton, PA - Northeast
Washington, DC - South
West Palm Beach, FL - South
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relatively low cost. Thus, as the baby-boom generation ages and accumulates wealth, the demand for site
specific attributes is expected to increase.
The
strengthening of this migration response suggests an
ongoing improvement in the interregional efficiency of
labor markets in the U.S.
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